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Abstract 
Fiqh, indicating Islamic law and the means to produce it, covers all aspects of 
human dealings, including Islamic financial law and its Shariah nominated contracts, 
which represent the bases for all Islamic banking and finance transactions. These 
contracts are either readily found in the classic books of Islamic law or modified 
versions adopted to suit the modern transactions of Islamic finance. In some cases 
they are a combination of more than one contract designed to serve a particular 
financing purpose, like the contract of Ijarah Muntahia Bittamlik where the 
transaction starts with lease and ends with sale. This paper comes to discuss the 
most important Ijtihad instruments that can be used by the Faqih to evaluate and 
endorse products in Islamic finance. It then elaborates on the instruments that are 
in use in the modern Islamic finance and which reflect a departure from Shariah 
rules and tools for Ijtihad. The objective of this paper is to shed light on the 
cotemporary Ijtihad in Fiqh of Finance in light of the guidelines provided by the 
Shariah in an attempt to draw the outlines of what constitutes a proper use of 
proper Ijtihad instruments in Islamic finance. 
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Introduction: 
Islamic law is considered by Muslims to be the most flexible heavenly revealed law when 
compared with the other revealed laws in their original versions. Thanks to this flexibility, 
Islamic law can accommodate many market needs. Elements of flexibility of Islamic financial 
law include: Permissibility being the original rule in Shariah, Shariah rules being not all fixed 
or permanent for they include the Mutaghiyyrat (changeable) and prohibition in Shariah 
not being of the same degree. Equipped with a flexible basis for legislation, the faqih 
(Muslim jurist) is provided with general guidelines that help him reach sound and 
acceptable rulings. These guidelines teach the faqih to observe while judging or developing 
a transaction: the structure of the transaction, the essence of the transaction, the general 
as well as the particular Shariah objectives of the transaction and the implications of 
implementing the transaction. Shariah also teaches the faqih to prioritize these 
requirements when compromising some is necessary. Well-established Shariah concepts, 
however, like Shariah policy, public interest and necessity have been used in the modern 
fiqh (Islamic law), especially in Islamic finance, to reprioritize these requirements and 
sometimes to unjustifiably sacrifice some. Although these concepts are Shariah concepts 
and some are originally valid Ijtihad (the process of deriving Shariah rules for the new 
incidents) instruments, applying them in the context of Islamic finance has raised major 
Shariah concerns. The following discussion outlines some of the valid Ijtihad instruments for 
Islamic finance, and then it elaborates on the instruments effectively in use and their 
Shariah concerns.    
The Proper Ijtihad instruments in Islamic Finance 
Shariah equips Shariah scholars conducting Ijtihad with multiple Ijtihad instruments that 
would help them structure and endorse products. The following are the most important 
Ijtihad instruments at the disposal of the Mujtahid.1 
 
                                                          
1 Mujtahid is the one who performs Ijtihad, i.e. the process of deriving the Shariah rules from their sources. 
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1. Shariah texts and their interpretations 
Shariah texts refer to Quran and Sunnah. In the area of financial transactions Shariah texts 
provide general rules and rarely provide details. This is because the nature of the financial 
transactions changes as they may get more sophisticated over time. Therefore, it would not 
be convenient to provide details on the inherently changeable contracts, because these 
details would not be relevant then to the modern applications of these contracts. The 
general rules provided by the Shariah texts, however, are sufficient for Muslim jurists to 
deduce Shariah rules for the modern transactions. When attempting Ijtihad, however, 
Muslim jurists may find that the same Shariah text pertaining to a financial transaction may 
be interpreted in multiple valid ways. In fact, this applies to most legal Shariah texts, and it 
explains the reasons why within the boundaries of Shariah existed different schools of Fiqh. 
Contemporary Shariah scholars do not need to restrict their fatwas (legal opinions) to one 
particular valid interpretation, or even to the interpretations made by the classic schools of 
Fiqh, as long as the interpretation they may opt for, or develop on their own, is basically 
valid; i.e. it is not in conflict with the established Shariah rules and principles, and the Arabic 
language admits that interpretation within the context of the text. 
 
2. Permissibility being the original ruling in Shariah 
In the absences of a clear and authoritative text, Mu’amalat (transactions) are deemed by 
Shariah to be halal (permissible). The prohibition, on the other hand, needs to be 
communicated to Muslims in definitive terms in order to be established over them. This, in 
fact, constitutes a vital tool for the Shariah scholars to endorse new Islamic banking and 
finance products and transactions. Any new structured products or transaction will be 
deemed as permissible as long as it is free from the prohibited elements like interest, 
gharar (uncertainty) or Ghabn (fraud).  
 
3. Prohibition being of different categories 
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Prohibition in the Shariah is not of the same category especially in the field of financial 
transactions, for there exist the so-called haram lithatihi (unlawful in itself) and haram 
lighairihi (unlawful in consideration of something else). The first prohibition is applicable to 
cases where the evil is embedded in the very act, like in Riba where charging interest is an 
evil in itself, or in gambling where it involves unjustified seizure of others’ properties. The 
second prohibition relates to acts that are originally lawful but made unlawful owing to the 
presence of certain conditions, like sale contract when concluded during Jum'a (Friday) 
prayer. 2 Although sale contract is originally halal (lawful) by virtue of some textual 
evidences, it is deemed haram (unlawful) if concluded during Jum’a prayer since engaging 
with sale, or any other transaction/activity , may lead to the evil of missing the Jum’a 
prayer. In other words, the haram lighairihi is unlawful in view of its results and 
implications.3 Being so, there is an avenue for acts under this category of prohibition not to 
be regarded unlawful if they can be construed as non leading to the perceived cautions. This 
means that if care is exercised for the act not to be conducive to the feared evil, then the 
act may be regarded as lawful. This in fact adds to the flexibility to Islamic law and functions 
as a relaxing instrument particularly within the framework of Islamic financial contracts.  
However, it remains the responsibility of Shariah scholars to identity the unlawful acts that 
can fall under this category of prohibition. This is in order to look into the possibility of 
excluding them by laying the appropriate conditions that will liberate these acts from their 
evil-producing nature. In this regard, it can be said that the very prohibition of gharar 
(uncertainty) is declared by some esteemed old Shariah scholars not to be meant for itself, 
but in conjunction with its possible evil implications (tahreem tharai’i) like the dispute it 
                                                          
2  Kamali, "Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence" p.330 
3  For more details on this matter see Abozaid, Abdulazeem. (2007). “Examining the Malaysian Shari’a 
Guidelines for Islamic REITs”, a paper presented at the  International Conference on Islamic Capital 
Market, which was organized by Muamalat Institute & Islamic Research and Training Institute in Jakarta, 
August 27-29. 
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may lead to between the parties to the contract.4 This means that gharar is prohibited only 
when evils are expected; if, however, no evil or harm to be expected, then the contracts 
involving gharar may be deemed as lawful. This stand may be supported by the existence of 
many exceptions Shariah made to gharar prohibition, like in validating gharar-bearing 
contracts like Salam and Istisna5’, and also in tolerating the minor gharar in all sorts of 
contracts. 
 
4. Analogy (Qiyas) 
Analogy is very instrumental for Ijtihad, it relates to the extension of a Shariah ruling of an 
old established case to a new case when the latter shares the same effective cause (illah) of 
the former. Since Shariah texts have stated the rulings of many financial transactions, the 
jurist (Faqih) may make use of these stated rulings by applying the same to the new 
transactions if they are found to be sharing the same illah. For example, the modern day 
financial derivatives, when used for hedging, have been basically found to be similar in 
essence to gambling and games of luck, therefore they have been ruled by contemporary 
scholar as unlawful since gambling itself is stated by Shariah texts as unlawful. Thus, qiyas is 
very vital and useful instrument, and it in fact ensures consistency between Shariah and 
reason. The challenge however is, to certain extend, in identifying the illah and to larger 
extend in assessing the similarity of the new case with the old case; a process that jurists 
have termed as takhqiq al-manat. 
 
5. Public interests (Maslaha Mursala) 
                                                          
4 Ibn Tayimiyah and Ibn Al-Qaiyyem have adopted this approach. Further details and discussion can be 
found in Al-Dareer, Al-Gharar wa Atharauhu fil Uqud, a book published in Arabic by Dar al-Jeel, 2009, 
second edition.  
5 Other examples include Khayar al-Shart (option of stipulation), and the sale of pregnant animals. In the 
first case, the contract is uncertain to the contractor who grants this option to the other and in the 
second case a part of the price goes implicitly to the pregnancy thought its outcome is not certain. 
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By definition, Maslaha Mursala refers to any interest that is deemed to be beneficial to the 
society and which has no textual evidence on its authority or otherwise. It is a juristic device 
whose authority has been established based on the fact that all Shariah rules are meant to 
realize public benefits. Muslim jurists have built on this fact the notion of Maslaha; deeming 
as permissible anything that realizes public interest, and as invalid or impermissible 
anything that brings about harm and evil. One of the basic conditions, however, for the 
operation of this juristic instrument is for the perceived Maslaha not to be in conflict with 
any Shariah text or established principles, because the human perception of Maslaha may 
err, and Shariah texts and principles must prevail over any human legal exercise.6 
Among the major fiqh schools, Maliki School is known to be the leading proponent of 
maslaha as one of Ijtihad instruments and sources of Shariah.  On the other hand, other 
fiqh schools reject it as independent source of Shari`ah though they practiced it, possibly 
under a different name7, without theoretically admitting its authority as an independent 
source of the Shariah. 8 
 
Relationship between maslaha & maqasid al-Shariah (Shariah objectives) 
Maslaha directly relates to Maqasid al-Shariah since the very realization of maslaha is the 
primary objective of the Shariah. Protection of religion, life, lineage, intellect and wealth are 
                                                          
6 The formulation of a rule on the basis of  ‘al-masalih al-mursalah’ must take into account the public 
interest and conform to the objectives of Shari`ah. The application of this tool must fulfill three main 
conditions. First, it only deals with transaction matters (muamalah) where reasoning through rational 
faculty is deemed to be plausible. Second, the interests should be in harmony with the spirit of Shariah. 
In other words it must not be in conflict with any of its main sources.  Third, the interests should be of 
essential and necessary (darurah) and not of a luxury type. For more details, see “The Devotional 
Dimension in Interest-oriented Shari’a Rulings” Article in Arabic, Journal of Islam in Asia, Volume 3, No 1, 
July 2006;  Sobhi R. Mahmassani, The Philosophy of Jurisprudence in Islam (Kuala Lumpur: Open Press, 
2000). 87-89. 
7 Istihsan, for example, which is adopted by the Hanafi school, leads in some of its applications to the 
same end result of Maslaha; it endorses Shariah rules based on their inherent benefits. 
8 Abozaid & Dasouki, “A Critical Appraisal of The Challenges of Realizing Maqasid Al-Shari'ah in Islamic 
Banking and Finance”, P 7, IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, International Islamic University 
Malaysia, Vol. 15, No 2, 2009. 
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the five essential values of Shariah, and all Shariah rules revert to these values. Rules of 
Ibadah (devotions), for example, relate to the protection of religion. Islamic rules of 
financial transactions, on the other hand, relate to the protection of wealth.  Protection of 
all these essential values is the ultimate maslaha for human beings and thus, it is the 
primary Shariah objective. 
 
6. Blocking the means to evil 
Among the valid juristic devices that the Mujtahid needs to uphold while attempting Ijtihad 
on a Shariah issue is Sad al-tharaiy’, which means blocking the means to evil before it 
materializes. A particular transaction could be lawful in itself but in view of its goal or 
outcome it may lead to evil and thus, it should be ruled as unlawful. Leasing a real estate 
property, for example, to a company that will use it as a gambling casino is unlawful though 
the lease contract in essence is lawful; this is in view of the implication of this lease 
contract, which is in this context facilitating the evil of gambling. Another application is sale 
contract when executed in a way that renders it an interest-bearing loan. Selling an asset on 
credit basis then buying it instantly on the spot for a cash price and in collusion with the 
buyer is effectively a Riba contract, whereby the original seller has advanced cash money to 
the buyer then claimed more from the same, and the asset of sale has been used only as a 
tool to presumably legalize the exchange of cash (inah sale).  
In fact, Sad al-tharaiy’ is of a special importance in Islamic finance since it protects it from 
the invasion of products that have a valid structure but an unlawful essence. It, in other 
words, helps ensure the identity of Islamic finance being genuinely distinguished from that 
of the conventional finance. 
Thus, Sad al-tharaiy’ is a juristic device that excludes rather than endorses new products, 
but yet it is an extremely vital tool to ensure the quality of the products being genuinely 
Shariah complaint and not conducive to the evils of the conventional banking and finance 
products.  
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Invalid Ijtihad Instruments & Applications  
Despite the valid instruments the Shariah equips the Mujtahid with when determining the 
Shariah validity of contracts and transactions as detailed above,  the contemporary Ijtihad 
in Islamic finance has departed from the proper tools and methodology of Ijtihad by 
adopting inapplicable instruments, twisting or misusing of applicable ones and overlooking 
important instruments as it is detailed in the following discussions.  
 
I. Use of inapplicable instruments 
 
1. Shariah Policy (al-Siyasah al-Shar’iyyah) 
The term Shariah policy has recently entered the jargon of the fatwas related to Islamic 
banking and finance. Some products and transactions have in their list of fatwa 
justifications the term Shariah policy. So what is Shariah policy and is it a valid instrument 
for endorsing products and transactions on its basis? 
 
a. Meaning of Shariah Policy 
Shariah policy, or al-siyasah al-Shar’iyyah, in its broad sense refers to the area in Islamic 
Fiqh that explains rulings related to policies and approaches taken in managing and 
organizing national policies in accordance with the spirit of the Shariah. It covers a whole 
spectrum of issues in areas like economics, the judiciary, politics and international 
relations.9 It is the management of the public and general affairs of the Muslim state in 
accordance with the public interests and the interest of the Muslim state. 
                                                          
9 Abozaid & Dasouki, “A Critical Appraisal of The Challenges of Realizing Maqasid Al-Shari'ah in Islamic 
Banking and Finance”, P 7, IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, International Islamic University 
Malaysia, Vol. 15, No 2, 2009. 
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Shariah policy involves different principles including striking the balance between what it is 
dictated by the circumstances and the stated Shariah rules. In other words, it gives the 
Muslim governor the needed flexibility to occasionally set aside an established Shariah rule 
in favor of a new rule recognizable by the Shariah if the latter serves the public interest in a 
better way. It may involve the temporary suspension of some Shariah provisions that relate 
to Mubahat (permissible things). In other words, it relates to Maslaha in its macro 
applications, and in some of its application it relates to the estimation of the general 
darurah (necessity) that is capable of rendering the prohibited things permissible or the 
obligatory things not mandatory. 
 
b. Who is to determine the Shariah policy? 
Shariah policy can only be determined by the Muslim government and cannot be left to be 
determined by individuals including Shariah scholars. This is because it relates to the 
management of the people and the state general affairs, which is the responsibility of the 
Muslim government.  Assuming the responsibilities of the Muslim government by 
independent individuals opens the door to some evils. Naturally, if they empowered to do 
so, they may produce conflicting policies and serve their own interests rather than the 
public interests.  
 
c. Mishandling of Shariah policy in Islamic finance 
Shariah scholars assuming the Muslim government’s responsibilities in determining Shariah 
Policies in Islamic finance 
In the absence of Shariah-committed Muslim governments and their roles in drawing up the 
necessary Shariah policies in Islamic finance to meet the challenges facing this industry, 
individual Shariah boards and scholars have taken up this responsibility of the Muslim 
government and engaged themselves in practicing the Shariah policy. However, the danger 
stems from the fact that realization of the people’s interests and the maintenance of 
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Shariah objectives, which are the core of Shariah policy, will have been then placed at risk. 
This is because Shariah policy is a quite sensitive principle. When Shariah scholars play 
Shariah policy, their presumed transparency may be potentially challenged and be 
influenced by the material gains they may derive from the rules they determine on the basis 
of their exercise of the Shariah policy. Obviously, Shariah scholars are not neutral or 
independent in this regard, but rather beneficiaries from the rules they may justify on 
Shariah policy basis. In other words, it is justifiably feared that this very sensitive legal tool 
called Shariah policy may be misused by the Shariah boards to tolerate unlawful 
transactions that would please their employers (Islamic banks) under the pretext and the 
claim that these transactions serve the public interest or the economies of the Muslim 
countries. Besides, competitions between banks and  lack of coordination among Shariah 
boards will very likely result in having conflicting assessments of the Shariah policy, yielding 
thus conflicting rules, products and stands on what constitutes a public interest. Eventually, 
it is the Ummah as a whole that will suffer from this practice and the Shariah policy will lead 
to what is just the opposite end of what it has been designed for.  
It is for these two reasons that the Islamic Shariah gives the power of determining Shariah 
policy to the Muslim government and not to individual bodies or entities. In fact, it is a tool 
in the hands of politicians, as the name indicates, and not in the hands of anyone else, and 
the absence of Shariah-observant Muslim government does not give the right to Shariah 
people to assume responsibilities which cannot be theirs. 
Moreover, determining an issue on the basis of Shariah policy is not simple; it is a process 
that involves observing different considerations such as the degree of urgency, measuring 
the harms against the benefits expected and the implications on all levels. It may also 
involve setting a timeframe that needs to be observed and possibly amended in light of the 
results, implications and the changing circumstances. Therefore, it is not a simple process 
but rather a one that requires an institution at the top government level. For this reason 
determining a Shariah policy is a joint governmental work. The Muslim ruler should set 
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Shariah policies after consultation with the Shura10 council which houses trustful and 
independent consultants of different specialties and backgrounds.  
Another important element that relates to the operation of Shariah policy is the 
enforcement of the policy, for the absence of the enforcement power may lead to opposite 
results. In the context of Islamic banking and finance, if not all of the financial institutions 
abide by the rules determined on Shariah policy basis, disorder and chaos will prevail, and 
these institutions will fail to play their perceived economic role in the society. Thus, even 
when the Shariah policy is played right by individuals, lack of enforcement will hinders its 
success and may turn it into a sheer evil.  
However, none of the above is observed when Shariah policy is determined by individual 
Shariah scholars or Shariah boards, and apart from those conditions of the operation of 
Shariah policy, lesson of experience have taught us that transparency is not something that 
can be taken for granted in any person, and Shariah scholars being humans and fallible are 
not exception. In fact, Shariah dictates that transparency and credibility must be sought in 
anyone who is to hold an office attending to public affairs and needs, but being a practical 
and realistic religion, Shariah does not stop at this point. It, in fact, places rules and 
restrictions on the conduct and the behavior of such a person. The Muslim judge for 
example must be among the most trustworthy persons to be eligible for his position, but his 
proved trustworthiness never gives him the right to take fees or accept gifts from the 
parties attending his court, for this may trigger his instinctively sinful human nature and 
thus influence his judgment and cause him to deviate from the path of justice. 
 
2. The Principle of Darurah (Necessity) 
It is a well established principle in Islamic law that Darurah, which means necessity, renders 
the prohibited things permissible. This principle is unanimously agreed upon by all schools 
of Islamic law, and it constitutes a Fiqh maxim that reads “Necessities permits the 
                                                          
10 Shura means consultation. 
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forbidden” (Al-Dharurat Tubih Al-Mahzurat). It means that the forbidden can be unsinfully 
committed when necessary. However, when jurists discussed and explained the 
applications of this fiqh maxim they mentioned what is known in Arabic as dawabit, which 
means conditions and guidelines, for the functionality of this maxim. These guidelines 
(dawabit) are of course stated in or derived from the Shariah texts. One of these guidelines 
relates to the very concept of darurah or what really constitutes a darurah. The jurists’ 
approach to the concept of legal darurah can be summarized by saying that darurah is 
something which is indispensable for the preservation and protection of the five essential 
values: Religion, Life, Intellect, lineage and Wealth.11 This means that the concept of 
darurah would give the Mukallaf (the Muslim charged with Shariah rules) the legal excuse 
to commit the forbidden when it becomes indispensable for his survival, spiritually and 
physically. 12 
Therefore, in order for the principle of darurah to be operative the underlying act must be 
indispensable for the survival of human being, i.e. it must be a necessity. However, some 
Fiqh schools have placed at par with necessity what is termed in the Shariah as Hajah (need) 
but only when it is public. The term hajah refers to a human need that is not essential for 
the survival of human beings, but it is important for their well being. In other words, hajah 
is what a human can survive without which but only with hardship and difficulties. For 
example, having a car is not a necessity in Shariah terms, but it could be a public need in 
some places. 
 
Misapplication of Darurah 
Darurah has been loosely used in Islamic banking and finance to justify products that would 
not pass Shariah scrutiny test and would breach basic Shariah rules. The justifying argument 
                                                          
11 Al-Shatibi, Al-Muwafaqat, 2/10. 
12 Majallat Al-Ahkam Al-‘adliyyah, section 22; Ibn Nujaim, Zainulddin, Al-Ashbah Wal Naza’ir, 1/105-107; 
Al-Seyoti, Jalaulddin, (911 H).  Al-Ashbah Wal Naza’ir, p.84-92; Al-Kurdi, Ahmad.  Al-Madkhil Al-Fiqhi, 
p.48. 
 
13 
 
predicates on the submission that such products are indispensible for the survival and long-
term sustainability of Islamic bank due to certain uncontrollable considerations. Very 
clearly, this argument presumes that the very concept of banking is a necessity in itself, 
while in the actual fact banking is not indispensable for the Mukallaf’s survival from the 
Shariah perspective, nor is it a public need in Shariah terms. If such darurah hypothetically 
exists, then it would rather legitimize dealing with conventional banks directly. 
Obviously, when Shariah prohibits something it always provides alternatives. For example 
when Shariah prohibits zina it permits marriage, when it prohibits wine and pork for 
consumption it permits all other sorts of food and drinks. Likewise, when Shariah prohibits 
certain contracts such as contracts based on riba (interest) and gharar (uncertainty), it 
alternatively permits many contracts like sale, lease, salam, istisna’, mudarabah and 
musharakah. To economists, such contracts are even better alternatives to riba and gharar, 
and ultimately can help develop a prosperous and healthy economy, while an economy that 
is based on riba and gharar deepens the disparity between rich and poor, and leads to 
inequitable and unjust wealth allocation in a given society. Thus, there is no darurah that 
may allow Islamic banks to abandon these beneficial contracts in favour of harmful and 
destructive ones. 
Moreover, tolerating a sinful activity on the basis of darurah never justifies the claim of its 
original permissibility. Islamic banks have tolerated certain products on the basis of darurah 
then offered the same to the public as Shariah compliant products. Obviously, this is a 
betrayal of Shariah rules and a betrayal of the clients’ trust, not to mention the negative 
effects of such attitude on the image of Shariah if not Islam in general. Promoting as Shariah 
compliant something which is not raises questions marks on the rationality of the religion 
by Muslim and non-Muslims alike, which may cause aversion to Islam.  
 
II. Misuse of valid instruments 
 
1. Misuse of Maslaha 
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Maslaha as a fiqh instrument has been overemphasized by contemporary Ijtihad in Islamic 
banking and finance. In some cases it has been treated as a priority over Shariah texts and 
Shariah established rules. Upon the existence of a conflict between a Shariah text or 
established rule and a Mujtahid’s (faqih’s) perception of Maslaha, the latter has been 
sometimes given a priority over the established Shariah text or rule. This work is a 
departure from the legal Maslaha, i.e. the Maslaha the carries a legislative power in Islamic 
law, for a variety of reasons: 
First, the claim of a possible conflict between Shariah text and maslaha is an erroneous 
claim. If the Shariah text or rule is definitive, then it cannot be in conflict with a real 
maslaha, because all Shariah rules aim at realization of maslaha. Therefore, in this case it is 
the assessment of maslaha by the Mujtahid which will be deemed erroneous.  In other 
words, the issue of a potential conflict existing between a definitive Shariah text and the 
maslaha is not conceivable if we are viewing maslaha from a Shariah perspective. However, 
if we are viewing maslaha from a human perspective then the conflict is plausible, but the 
determination of what is beneficial and what is harmful cannot be left to human reasoning 
alone13. Human reasoning it that regard plays a role only within the framework guided by 
Shariah (Nyazee 2000). This is because, the inherent limitations of human beings posit a 
strong reason which requires Divine guidance to ascertain what is right and what is wrong.14  
   Second, even if such a conflict hypothetically exists, then it is the Shariah texts that must 
be given priority over maslaha. This is particularly true since maslaha derives its authority 
from the Shariah text and not vice versa. It is illogical to give priority to a branch over its 
core and source of authority.15  
                                                          
13 His argument is supported by a number of Qur’ānic verses. One of which is Qur’ān 23:71. Refer to Al-‘iz 
bin Abdelsalam, Qua’id Al-Ahkam fi Masalih Al-Anam, 2/161.  
14 Abozaid & Dasouki, “A Critical Appraisal of The Challenges of Realizing Maqasid Al-Shari'ah in Islamic 
Banking and Finance”, P 7, IIUM Journal of Economics and Management, International Islamic University 
Malaysia, Vol. 15, No 2, 2009. 
15 Al-Zuhaili Wahbah, Al-Waseet fi Usul al-Fiqh, p. 361. 
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   Third, the approach of giving priority to maslaha fails to distinguish between a definitive 
(qat`y) and a speculative (zanniy) text. If the text is definitive with regards to its authenticity 
(thubut) and meaning (dilalah), then the ruling it produces is final and binding; i.e. there is 
no room for human’s perception of maslaha to add any interpretation to the text.While if 16 
the text is speculative with regards to its authenticity or meaning, then there may be an 
avenue for the perceived maslaha to further interpret and give meaning to the text in a way 
that does not hinder its realization. This is acceptable as long as the perceived maslaha 
meets all of its conditions: being public not private, authentic not false, definitive not 
probable.17 
 
To summarize, upon presuming an occurrence of a genuine conflict between the Shariah 
text  and the maslaha, then priority must be given to the Shariah text and not the perceived 
maslaha, this is provided the Shariah text is definitive it terms of authenticity and meaning. 
If, however, there is a justifiable doubt over the authenticity or the meaning of the text, 
then there is an avenue for the perceived maslaha to reconcile with the text. 
 
2. Twisted interpretations of  Shariah texts & Fiqh statements 
 Some Interpretations of Shariah texts that came in the form of fiqh statements made by 
some fiqh schools have been twisted to help legitimize certain problematic Islamic banking 
and finance products. For example, although sale of future debt to a third party is ruled as 
unlawful by all fiqh schools based on some Shariah texts, its validity has been falsely 
attributed to some fiqh schools (like the Shafi’i school), and a groundless distinction has 
been made between a debt resulting from a loan contract and a debt resulting from other 
financial contracts; allowing the later and forbidding the former. In fact, both the validity of 
                                                          
16 See in Al-Ghazali, Al-Mustasfah, p176; Al-Bouti, Dhawabit Al-Maslah, p119. 
17 Al-Bouti, Dawabit Al-Maslah, p.119. 
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sale of debt and this distinction have no ground whatsoever, and this position is based on 
twisted interpretation of Shariah texts and some fiqh statement. 18 
Another example is Inah sale, although all fiqh schools base the permissibility of the 
contract on its essence and objective, rather than its form and structure, which is the basis 
for the validity of the contract, cotemporary fatwas in Islamic finance have implied the 
opposite; considering a contract Shariah compliant only if its form and structure are sound 
from Shariah perspective. Not only do these fatwas contravene Shariah texts and principles 
by basing contracts permissibility on their form and structure rather than essence and 
objective, but some of them attribute also such erroneous stand to the Shafi’i Fiqh School 
when they claim that this school rules the permissibility19 of inah sale. 20 
III. Overlooking important instruments 
 
1. Relevant Shariah texts  
Some Shariah texts have been overlooked in fatwas on Islamic banking and finance 
products although they are closely related to the fatwas in questions. For example, Shariah 
texts very clearly state that combining between a sale contract and a loan contract in one 
transaction is unlawful between sale and  to combineprohibited (It is  21"عيبو فلس لحي لا"
loan), and like sale contract in this regard is any commutative contracts as elaborated by the 
                                                          
18 For details on this issue refer to Abozaid, Abdulazeem. “Examining the New Applications of Sale of Debt 
in the Islamic Financial Institutions", Journal of Islam in Asia, Volume 5, No 2, December 2008.  It can be 
downloaded from www.abdulazeem-abozaid.com  
19 For details on these sales see Abozaid, Abdulazeem “Contemporary Inah is it a sale or usury” a book 
published in Arabic by Dar Al-Multaqa, Aleppo, Syria, 2004; Abozaid Abdulazeem. “Contemporary Islamic 
Financing Modes between Contracts Technicalities and Shari’ah Objectives”, Eighth Harvard University 
Forum on Islamic Finance, Harvard Law School – Austin Hall, USA, April 19-20, (2008). 
20 Abozaid, Abdulazeem. "Examining Bay' al-'inah and its New Applications in the Islamic Financial 
Institutions", Journal of Al-Tamaddun, Volume 4, December 2008.  
http://umrefjournal.um.edu.my/public/article-view.php?id=2318 
21 This Hadith is reported in many Sunnah authoritative books including: Sunan AbiDaud, (3504) and Sunan Al-
Termithi, (1234). 
17 
 
jurists.22 This is because the sale or the commutative contract in general could be used to 
cater to interest in the loan contract. For example, interest can be catered to in sale 
contract by demanding a price that is higher or lower than the market value, like in the 
lender colluding with the borrower to give him an interest-free loan but conditional on the 
latter buying from the former something at higher than the market value, or selling him 
something at lower than the market value. 
 However, this Shariah text has been totally overlooked in a variety of products, like in a 
product named “Islamic Pawn Broking”. Herein the bank provides a so-called interest-free 
loan but conditional on the borrower providing valuables that will be safeguarded by the 
bank against fees, so that the bank can profit from the loan indirectly through the fees 
charged on the safekeeping of the valuables. Another product is the service-based Islamic 
Credit Cards, the issuing bank provides the card credit on interest-free loan basis; however, 
it charges the card holder for the embedded services as well as the extra services coupled 
with the card, like the free stuff the card holder may be entitled to when subscribing to the 
card.  This practice is basically valid, but provided the fees are against the services and not 
the loan. To ensure it is so, the market value of these services must not be lower than the 
fees charged on the card. However, in practice it is much lower, which means that the fees 
are meant to cater to the interest over the loan. 
 
2. Blocking the means to evil 
Although this instrument is vital and important for identifying the Shariah compliant 
products and for protecting contracts from being misused and manipulated as elaborated 
earlier, it has not received the due attention by Shariah scholars giving fatwas to Islamic 
banks. This is evidenced by the existence of products criticized for being genuinely no 
different from the conventional products, and by the misapplication of some Islamic finance 
products to the degree of distortion. Had this instrument been observed and applied, it 
would have removed these practices form the shelves of Islamic banks and filtered 
                                                          
22 Al-Dasuqi. Hashiyah, 3/76. 
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financing deals so that no financing would be given when resulting in unfavorable 
implications  
 
Conclusion 
From the past discussions it can be concluded that Shariah has equipped Muslim jurists and 
Scholars with useful and practical fiqh instruments that if used properly will yield sound 
transactions and products.  However, some of these instruments were misused, others 
were overlooked and some inappropriate instruments were also introduced.  
These practices have been responsible for the invasion of some controversial products into 
Islamic finance and to the misapplication of some other products. This phenomenon has 
been in fact the natural result of the disorder and the lack of or weak Shariah governance in 
Islamic banks. Despite the great importance of Ijtihad and fatwa in the field of Islamic 
finance and their serious implications, this area has not received the due attention. In fact, 
the situations call for the following urgent reforming steps: 
- Ijtihad in Islamic finance must be exercised by Ijtihad institution and not be 
individuals at least on the products level, whereby only an independent centralized 
Shariah committee shall have the sole authority to endorse or reject products. 
- The independent central Shariah committee must include besides highly qualified 
Shariah scholars economists, lawyers and financial experts, and it must have a 
binding authority over the individual Shariah boards. 
- In the absence of the Shariah-committed Muslim government, a body comprising 
highly qualified intellectuals of different relevant specialties, similar to Shura council, 
can be formed to handle matters related to Shariah policy, and it can collaborate 
with the central Shariah committee to determine the Shariah policy related to 
Islamic finance. 
- All fatwas issued by individual Shariah boards or scholars must be subjected to 
scrutiny by the centralized Shariah committee. Procedurally, the centralized Shariah 
committee must have the authority to conduct unannounced Shariah auditing visits. 
19 
 
- Shariah scholars setting on Shariah boards must be accredited by a centralized 
qualified institution based on certain criteria, excluding the Shariah specialists who 
do not qualify for Ijtihad or fatwas. 
  
Indeed, segregation between the Ijtihad institution and the political system has led to 
chaotic approaches to Ijtihad and fatwas by individual Shariah scholars. This disorder did 
not carry much of evil before, but with the advance of Islamic banks it produced serious 
damages. The same disorder and confusion, however, will inevitably take place even in 
other fields of the Muslims’ affairs when they get the chance to be applied on institutional 
level, because the roots of the problem are the same; mainly the rupture between the 
political system and the Ijtihad institution. 
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